And therefore, after He has exhorted His hearers that they should prepare themselves to bear all things for truth and righteousness, and that they should not hide the good which they were about to receive, but should learn with such benevolence as to teach others, aiming in their good works not at their own praise, but at the glory of God, He begins now to inform and to teach them what they are to teach; as if they were asking Him, saying: “Lo, we are willing both to bear all things for Your name, and not to hide Your doctrine; but what precisely is this which You forbid us to hide, and for which You command us to bear all things? Are You about to mention other things contrary to those which are written in the law?” “No,” says He; “for think not that I have come to destroy the law, or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil.”
In this sentence the meaning is twofold. We must deal with it in both ways. For He who says, “I am not come to destroy the law, but to fulfil,” means it either in the way of adding what is wanting, or of doing what is in it. Let us then consider that first which I have put first: for he who adds what is wanting does not surely destroy what he finds, but rather confirms it by perfecting it; and accordingly He follows up with the statement, “Verily I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass, one iota or one tittle shall in nowise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled.”
For, if even those things which are added for completion are fulfilled, much more are those things fulfilled which are sent in advance as a commencement. Then, as to what He says, “One iota or one tittle shall in nowise pass from the law,” nothing else can be understood but a strong expression of perfection, since it is pointed out by means of single letters, among which letters iota is smaller than the others, for it is made by a single stroke; while a tittle is but a particle of some sort at the top even of that. And by these words He shows that in the law all the smallest particulars even are to be carried into effect.
After that He subjoins: “Whosoever, therefore, shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so, he shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven.” Hence it is the least commandments that are meant by one iota and one tittle. And therefore, whosoever shall break and shall teach men so, that is, in accordance with what he breaks, not in accordance with what he finds and reads, shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven; and therefore, perhaps, he will not be in the kingdom of heaven at all, where only the great can be.
But whosoever shall do and teach men so, that is, who shall not break, and shall teach men so, in accordance with what he does not break, shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven. But in regard to him who shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven, it follows that he is also in the kingdom of heaven, into which the great are admitted: for to this what follows refers.
“For I say unto you, that unless your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, you shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven”; that is, unless you shall fulfil not only those least precepts of the law which begin the man, but also those which are added by Me, who am not come to destroy the law, but to fulfil it, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.
But you say to me: if, when He was speaking above of those least commandments, He said that whosoever shall break one of them, and shall teach in accordance with his transgression, is called the least in the kingdom of heaven; but that whosoever shall do them, and shall teach men so, is called great, and hence will be already in the kingdom of heaven, because he is great: what need is there for additions to the least precepts of the law, if he can be already in the kingdom of heaven, because whosoever shall do them, and shall teach men so, is great?
For this reason that sentence is to be understood thus: “But whosoever shall do and teach men so, the same shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven,” that is, not in accordance with those least commandments, but in accordance with those which I am about to mention.
Now what are they? “That your righteousness,” says He, “may exceed that of the scribes and Pharisees; for unless it shall exceed theirs, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.” Whosoever, therefore, shall break those least commandments, and shall teach men so, shall be called the least; but whosoever shall do those least commandments, and shall teach men so, is not necessarily to be reckoned great and fit for the kingdom of heaven; but yet he is not so much the least as the man who breaks them.
But in order that he may be great and fit for that kingdom, he ought to do and teach as Christ now teaches, that is, in order that his righteousness may exceed that of the scribes and Pharisees. The righteousness of the Pharisees is, that they shall not kill; the righteousness of those who are destined to enter into the kingdom of God is, that they be not angry without a cause.
The least commandment, therefore, is not to kill; and whosoever shall break that shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven; but whosoever shall fulfil that commandment not to kill will not, as a necessary consequence, be great and fit for the kingdom of heaven, but yet he ascends a certain step.
He will be perfected, however, if he be not angry without a cause; and if he shall do this, he will be much further removed from murder. For this reason he who teaches that we should not be angry does not break the law not to kill, but rather fulfils it; so that we preserve our innocence both outwardly when we do not kill, and in heart when we are not angry.
You have heard, therefore, says He, that it was said to them of old time, “You shall not kill; and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment.” But I say unto you, that whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, “Raca,” shall be in danger of the council: but whosoever shall say, “You fool,” shall be in danger of the gehenna of fire.
What is the difference between being in danger of the judgment, and being in danger of the council, and being in danger of the gehenna of fire? For this last sounds most weighty, and reminds us that certain stages were passed over from lighter to more weighty, until the gehenna of fire was reached. And, therefore, if it is a lighter thing to be in danger of the judgment than to be in danger of the council, and if it is also a lighter thing to be in danger of the council than to be in danger of the gehenna of fire, we must understand it to be a lighter thing to be angry with a brother without a cause than to say “Raca”; and again, to be a lighter thing to say “Raca” than to say, “You fool.” For the danger would not have gradations, unless the sins also were mentioned in gradation.
But here one obscure word has found a place, for “Raca” is neither Latin nor Greek. The others, however, are current in our language. Now, some have wished to derive the interpretation of this expression from the Greek, supposing that a ragged person is called “Raca,” because a rag is called in Greek ῥάκος; yet, when one asks them what a ragged person is called in Greek, they do not answer “Raca.” Further, the Latin translator might have put the word “ragged” where he has placed “Raca,” and not have used a word which, on the one hand, has no existence in the Latin language, and, on the other, is rare in the Greek.
Hence the view is more probable which I heard from a certain Hebrew whom I had asked about it; for he said that the word does not mean anything, but merely expresses the emotion of an angry mind. Grammarians call those particles of speech which express an affection of an agitated mind interjections; as when it is said by one who is grieved, “Alas,” or by one who is angry, “Hah.” And these words in all languages are proper sounds, and are not easily translated into another language; and this cause certainly compelled alike the Greek and the Latin translators to put the word itself, inasmuch as they could find no way of translating it.
There is, therefore, a gradation in the sins referred to, so that first one is angry, and keeps that feeling as a conception in his heart. But if now that emotion shall draw forth an expression of anger not having any definite meaning, but giving evidence of that feeling of the mind by the very fact of the outbreak wherewith he is assailed with whom one is angry, this is certainly more than if the rising anger were restrained by silence. But if there is heard not merely an expression of anger, but also a word by which the party using it now indicates and signifies a distinct censure of him against whom it is directed, who doubts but that this is something more than if merely an exclamation of anger were uttered?
Hence in the first there is one thing, that is, anger alone; in the second two things, both anger and a word that expresses anger; in the third three things, anger and a word that expresses anger, and in that word the utterance of distinct censure. Look now also at the three degrees of liability: the judgment, the council, the gehenna of fire. For in the judgment an opportunity is still given for defence; in the council, however, although there is also wont to be a judgment, yet because the very distinction compels us to acknowledge that there is a certain difference in this place, the pronouncement of the sentence seems to belong to the council, inasmuch as it is not now the case of the accused himself that is in question, whether he is to be condemned or not, but they who judge confer with one another to what punishment they ought to condemn him, who, it is clear, is to be condemned.
But the gehenna of fire does not treat as a doubtful matter either the condemnation, like the judgment, or the punishment of him who is condemned, like the council; for in the gehenna of fire both the condemnation and the punishment of him who is condemned are certain. Thus there are seen certain degrees in the sins and in the liability to punishment; but who can tell in what ways they are invisibly shown in the punishments of souls?
We are therefore to learn how great the difference is between the righteousness of the Pharisees and that greater righteousness which introduces into the kingdom of heaven. While it is a more serious crime to kill than to inflict reproach by means of a word, in the one case killing exposes one to the judgment, but in the other anger exposes one to the judgment, which is the least of those three penalties. For in the former case they were discussing the question of murder among men, but in the latter all things are disposed of by means of a divine judgment, where the end of the condemned is the gehenna of fire.
But whoever shall say that murder is punished by a more severe penalty under the greater righteousness, if a reproach is punished by the gehenna of fire, compels us to understand that there are differences of gehennas.
Indeed, in the three statements before us, we must observe that some words are understood. For the first statement has all the words that are necessary: “Whosoever,” says He, “is angry with his brother without a cause, shall be in danger of the judgment.” But in the second, when He says, “And whosoever shall say to his brother, ‘Raca,’” there is understood the expression “without cause,” and thus there is subjoined, “shall be in danger of the council.”
In the third, now, where He says, “But whosoever shall say, ‘You fool,’” two things are understood, both “to his brother” and “without cause.” And in this way we defend the apostle when he calls the Galatians fools, to whom he also gives the name of brethren; for he does not do it without cause. And here the word brother is to be understood for this reason, that the case of an enemy is spoken of afterwards, and how he also is to be treated under the greater righteousness.
